THE IMPACT OF ECOWAS MORATORIUM ON THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS ON NIGERIA

THE IMPACT OF ECOWAS MORATORIUM ON THE PROLIFERATION OF SMALL ARMS AND LIGHT WEAPONS ON NIGERIA

Moses U. Ikoh, Ph.D

Correspondence:

Department of Sociology,

University of Jos,

Plateau State, Nigeria.

E-mail: [email protected]

 

Abstract

The proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria in the West African sub- region exerts negative impact on socio-political and economic development. This realization prompted ECOWAS to come up with a moratorium on small arms and lights weapons control. Guided by the Programmes for the Coordination and Assistance for Security Development (PCASED), each member sate formed a National Committee to monitor the unlawful circulation of arms in their country. Nigeria established NATCOM for this purpose. Despite the existence of this NATCOM, small arms and light weapons are freely circulating in the country. Evidences from ethno-religious and political violence as well as armed robbery bear confirmation. The paper observes the constraint in the eradication of small arms and light weapons to include the porousity of the countries’ boarder, existence of local manufacturers (Blacksmiths), increase in violent crime waves and the inability of the security agencies to control it. It therefore calls for cooperation among the security agencies, the criminalization of electoral violence, a deliberate effort by government to promote peaceful co-existence in the country and the decentralization of NATCOM activities, among others, to curb the proliferation of arms and light weapons in the country.

Introduction

The Economic Community of West African State (ECOWAS) was formed in 1975 in Lagos for the purpose of promoting economic integration of the West African sub-region. Fifteen years after the formation, civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone as well as other localized conflicts plunged the sub-region into theatre of conflicts and insecurity that threatened the goals that brought ECOWAS into existence. In 1993 when the heads of state and government met to revised ECOWAS treaty, achieving “regional security” became a common consensus. The revised treaty thus created room for socio-political and economic interests. Protocols relating to ECOWAS parliament, community court of justice, common currency, conflict prevention, management, resolution, peace keeping and security were initiated to strengthen the sub-regional organization.

Article 58 of ECOWAS revised treaty which provides for “regional security” establishes a mechanism for conflict prevention, management and resolution and peace keeping within member state. It creates and consolidates the conditions in which West African States can react promptly to crisis situations particularly in the area of early warning signs, control of cross-boarder crime, international terrorism and the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.1

The realization of peace in the sub-region has a positive relationship with the control of small arms and light weapons in circulation. This is because current evidence has suggested that the availability of small arms and light weapons and the willingness to use maximum force in interpersonal and communal conflicts is strongly associated with increasing lethality of criminal activities.2 In Nigeria, small arms and light weapons have been used in almost all part of the country to make blood letting statement.3 Virtually everyday, bandits, armed robbers, assassins, ethnic and religious militants have employ armed to threaten the peace of the country. Violent attacks on individuals and endemic fratricidal ethnic wars and religious crisis in several parts of the country employ the use of small arms and light weapons. Scarce household resources are being devoted to the treatment and care of small arms and light weapons’ victims. In the university campuses and other higher institutions, disagreement between cult groups often found expression in violent, during which small arms are used to unleash terror.

Articles 50 and 51 of ECOWAS protocol on regional security deal with the control of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons. Other than the acquisition of arms for legitimate national defence and security needs as well as international peacekeeping operation, the protocol seeks to eradicate illegal flow of arms by controlling their importation, exportation and manufacture; detect, collect and destroy all illegal weapons; enhance weapon control at boarder posts; establish a database and regional arm register, facilitate dialogue with producers and suppliers of weapons among others.4

Small arms and light weapons are not only in the hands of combatants but also among the civilian populations. They are often handmade and can be found or bought openly in the market.5 In recognition of these facts the protocol provides for the establishment of national committee in each member country to checkmate the illegal circulation of arms and light weapons. The committee draws its members from the ministries of defence, interior, security, justice, foreign affairs and civil society. Apart from creating awareness within member states, the committee is required among others to cooperate and share experiences with committees in other member states, bring their work to the attention of bilateral or multilateral institutions, help the authorities to comply with their international obligations to combat the proliferation of small arms and light weapons.6

Nigeria is a leading member of the Economic Community of the West African States (ECOWAS). In response to the directive of ECOWAS, a 12 man National Committee (NATCOM) was inaugurated for the implementation of the moratorium. In July, 2001, the NATCOM destroyed a stockpile of 1,257 weapons and ammunition. Yet concerning is mounting over the increased use of small arms and light weapons in the country. In the 2008 and 2010 Jos crisis small arms were freely used, thus undermining the authority of the state and its ability to protect its citizens. The human cost of small arms and light weapons misuse have social and economic consequences. The fact that these arms are in the hands of criminal groups, militant of religious and ethnic leaning makes the concern a national issue. What then is the impact of the ECOWAS moratorium on the proliferation of these arms in Nigeria? In seeking to answer this question, the paper examines arms proliferation in the country vis-à-vis the moratorium. It assesses the factors that are belittling the effort of the national commission in curbing small arms proliferation in Nigeria. The main objective of the paper, however, is to focus on the strategies that would have to be introduced and the rethinking that would have to be done to realize the goals of the moratorium given the reality of arms and light weapons in Nigeria.

The ECOWAS moratorium on small arms and light weapons

The moratorium on the importation, exportation and manufacturing of small arm and light weapon in ECOWAS member states (otherwise called the Moratorium) was adopted on 31st October, 1998. In order to ensure the effective enforcement of the moratorium, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) lent a helping hand in the establishment of Programmes for the Coordination and Assistance for Security and Development (PCASED) at the request of ECOWAS heads of state and government. PCASED was tasked with establishing a culture of peace, conducting training programmes for the military, security and police officers and implementing weapon controls at the boarder posts. It has the mandate to collect and destroy surplus and unauthorized weapons, facilitate dialogue with producers and suppliers of weapons and review and harmonize national legislations and administrative procedures of member states as they relate to weapons control.7

In order to ensure effective application of the moratorium, institutional structures were set up at the national level in each member state and at the ECOWAS secretariat. The structures assist in information exchange, harmonization of legislation and administrative measure, peace operation, weapon registration, exemptions and issuing of visitors certificate regarding the possession of weapons in the area covered by the moratorium.8 A code of conduct which regulates arms acquisition stipulates that “for any member state to acquire arms and munitions, a written request stating the caliber of arms, munitions, quantity and quality must be submitted to the ECOWAS secretariat”.9 The secretariat in collaboration with PCASED would then dialogue with the arms manufacturer and suppliers. This process enhances the establishment of a database and regional arm register. Weapons are given identification number which enables them to be traced when there is trans-boarder movement and when sold or borrowed.

The activities of PCASED toward the implementation of the moratorium have been documented10.  But the positive impact of these activities in terms of the reduction of small arms and light weapons has not been felt, especially in Nigeria.

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria

The end of the civil war in Nigeria in 1970 marked a sharp rise in the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country. The Nigerian police recorded 12,153 incidences of violent crime associated with arms as against 2,315 incidences recorded in 1967 before the outbreak of the war11. This perhaps explains the promulgation of the “Robbery and Firearms (Special Provision) Decree No. 47 of 1970. Since then the proliferation of weapons in the country is by no means waning. The number of small arms and ammunition recovered by the police has been acknowledged12. In 2001, for instance, 1,103 firearms were recovered by the police. This figure rose to 3,100 firearms in 2002, and 5,405 firearms and 420,281 ammunition in 2004. Though the exact figure is not known, it is estimated that between 1996 and 1998, more than 6,000 riffles and pistols and about 200,000 ammunition of various brands were impounded from illegal owners13.

In an attempt to mop up small arms and light weapons in circulation, the Rivers State Government introduced a buy-back programme, which persuaded owners of firearms to voluntarily return them to Government for cash rewards. Only the Presidential Disarmament Committee that attempted to reconcile the militia factions of Ateke Tom and Asari Dokubo succeeded in destroying a total of 854 guns, 1,352 rounds of ammunition, 2 grenades and 11 pieces of explosives14. It is doubtful if the impact of the programme in moping up firearms in circulation met the expectation of Government in the reduction of small arm and light weapons in the state when compared with the number of both small arms and sophisticated weapons that was turned in by the militants during the amnesty declaration.

Researches in firearms control point to a multitude of unauthorized sources of firearms that includes, smugglers, illegal armed dealers and armed robbers, who have formed powerful cartels that have flooded Nigeria with dangerous weapon15. Nigerian porous borders remain sources of arms trafficking. This is in addition to firearms from blacksmiths and returnee ECOMOG soldiers from peacekeeping duties in Liberia, Sierra Leone and other places as well as unaccounted rifles from the disintegrated strike force commanded by Major Al-Mustapha during Abacha dictatorship. Both criminals and some unscrupulous security agents who have turned themselves to middlemen patronise these sources. Various groups, particularly ethnic militia – OPC in the South West, militants in the Niger Delta area, Egbesu Boys in the South South, Arewa Boys in the North and the Bakassi Boys in the South East, are believed to have imported firearms into the country16.

The cost of pistols and revolvers ranged from N3,000 to N7,000, depending on who is selling it. Since they are cheap and small, they can be carried around. Their long service life makes it possible for some weapons to be passed from one conflict to the other. The same gun used in armed robbery can be used for murder and assassination and thus continue to contribute to instability and violent crime in the country17. Two-thirds of police deaths in line of duty are attributed to firearms of different sizes and brands18.

The climate of fear, coupled with the determination of people to protect themselves, their families and property have made many Nigerians to acquire firearms from smugglers and those dealing in illegal arms. Unfortunately firearms owned for protection against criminals are often used to inflict injury on innocent people or even oneself19. The history of domestic violence shows that many murders that happened following a “romantic triangle or some other type of altercation or quarrel is as a result of having firearms at home”20. An example of this occurred in Calabar in 2003, when a renowned Pastor unknowingly shot himself to death in attempt to test a rifle bought for self-protection against incessant invasion of his home by armed criminals.

The presence of a weapon during an argument can escalate the level of violence producing a murder when an assault would have occurred if no firearms had been present Firearm gives some robbers and rapists the courage to commit crimes that they would otherwise have avoided. On this realization, government decided to restrict and control gun ownership. The Firearm control Act (1980) prohibits civilians from buying, selling, transferring, or possessing firearms without license, and recommends punishment that ranges from one-year jail term to 5 years imprisonment or a fine of N100,000.00 or both. It was hoped that:

Licensing and permit laws with periodic check will reduce homicide and perhaps suicides; ban on gun possession may reduce robbery and aggravated assault; locally licensing of gun dealers may reduce robbery, aggravated assault and suicide; mandatory penalties for unlicensed gun carrying may reduce robbery; and discretional add-on penalties for committing crime with a gun may reduce homicide, robbery, and rape21.

The futility of the firearm prohibition law has been observed in the study of armed criminals in the city of Port Harcourt:

The rate of armed robbers caught with firearms increases astronomically between 1980 and 1990. The average yearly increase   was 299 per cent while the highest rate of increase of 733.3 per cent was recorded in 1984. The high average yearly

increase may have resulted from severe economic problems occurring in the Nation during the period, but could likely increase irrespective of whether the period was boom or crisis22.

The lack of positive impact of the Firearms Prohibition Act is attributed to the insincerity of the law enforcement officers. In Lagos, the commander of the State Special Anti-Robbery Squad (SARS) was found to be aiding and abetting armed robbery, the crime he was paid to prevent and smash23. The Anini’s criminal exploit in the former Bendel State of Nigeria (now Edo and Delta State) was largely facilitated by dubious police officers who gave information on the daily patrol of police as well as selling of firearms to the criminal gang24.

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons are therefore possible through the connivance of dubious security operatives. Apart from abetting some robbers who pay them heavily in order to maintain and serve contact25, Policemen who are attached to the Armed Robbery Prevention Unit are free to request for any quantity of ammunition, which is not accounted for. Such tradition enables corrupt officers among them to supply some ammunition to armed criminals26.

The local blacksmiths who have their firearms producing workshops located in remote places pay monthly toll to the police for protection against arrest. And in many instances, the police and other security agents act as middlemen for those who want their products27. In the absence of effective law enforcement, the expected certainty and severity of punishment from the Firearm Control Act (1980) become insignificant, demonstrating the inability of the Criminal Justice System nay the National Commission on security to keep firearms out of the hands of potential offenders. Other than these, researches reveal that criminals steal their firearms from those who obtained them with licence from legitimate retail outlets. They may also buy them from friends, family members, or street sources such as drug addicts28,29.

Constraints to ECOWAS moratorium in Nigeria

Monitoring and preventing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria could be constrained by several factors. Nigeria has 770 kilometres of shared boarder with the Republic of Benin, around 1,500 kilometers with the Republic of the Niger, 1,700 kilometers with the Cameroon, 90 kilometers with Chad and 850 kilometers of maritime border in the Atlantic Ocean30. These boarders are not effectively patrolled, and are becoming havens for smugglers. The republic of Cameroon which shared a large land and sea boarder with Nigeria is not within the ECOWAS sub-region and is therefore not bound by the ECOWAS moratorium. The harmonization of laws and trans-boarder checks relating to small arms and light weapons cannot affect her.

Local blacksmith also produce small arms which are not easily accounted for. From long single barrel guns made for hunting and traditional festivals, blacksmiths have perfected their trade into the production of pistols and double barrel guns. Some of these guns have been used in ethno-religious violence and armed robbery. Beside arms supplied by the blacksmith, many small arms and light weapons circulating in Nigeria are stolen ones. Many of the weapons stolen from the police by armed robbers have not been recovered. When armed men broke into the Custom service’s armoury in Owerri, a substantial quantity of arms was stolen, which have not been found till today31.

The increase in violent crime wave and ethno-religious crisis in Nigeria has fueled the demand for small arms and light weapons. When violent criminals go unpunished, citizens may resort to unlawful acquisition of weapons for self protection32. The heterogeneous nature of Nigerian society and lack of respect for peaceful co-existence often generate conflicts which result in the use of weapons. Beginning from the Ogbe-Ijaw ethnic war, the Junkin-Tiv crisis to the Niger delta struggle, small arms and light weapons have played important role in their escalation. In the Niger Delta, not only were small arms and light weapons acquired by the militants, but also sophisticated and automatic weapons. It is doubtful if all the weapons have been surrendered as claimed by the militants under the amnesty deal.

Religious intolerance has equally bred crisis reminiscent of the historical jihad. What the Maitatsine riots of the 1980s started has found a continuation in the “Boko Haram’ of the 2009. Sophisticated weapons have been used to make bloodletting statements. Many citizens have acquired arms either to demonstrate faith in their religion or for self protection. Beside religious crisis, political violence as expressed in political thuggery during electioneering campaigns and elections has encouraged proliferation of arms in the country. Guns have been used in kidnapping, bullying and the assassination of political opponents. Influential politicians who brought in these weapons have neither been arrested nor prosecuted in the court of law. Recent research revealed that “of the 12,000 people arrested for illegal ownership of firearms in Nigeria in 2005, only 500 of them were charged to court” 33. It is not ascertain how many were convicted. But the fact that not all arrests result in trial could only encouraged trafficking in guns and the proliferation of weapons in the country.

Suggestions towards curbing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria

It is heart warming to note that a number of arms producers organised within the Wassenger Arrangement have given commitment to PCASE that they will respect the moratorium and refrain from exporting weapons to West Africa34. Yet, combating the proliferation of arms remains our responsibility.

  1. Need for intelligence networking

The national Committee (NATCOM) for the control of the proliferation of arms draws its membership from the security forces, the interior and foreign ministries as well as the civil society. The expectation is that shared intelligence, coordination, communication and patrol can result in the reduction of small arms and light weapons proliferation in the country. We have seen this in road blocks and patrols especially by the army and the police in the country. Evidence exist that intelligence network among security forces can yield breakthrough in crime detection, prevention and control35. There is need therefore for a joint and standardized communication network among the security forces that can enhance result oriented patrols.

  1. Road blocks

Road blocks appear to be counter productive in Nigeria. Instead of revealing arms traffickers and criminals, many legal and illegal road blocks have been turned into illegal toll collecting points by security officers. And many innocent Nigerians have lost their lives at road blocks36. However, with proper coordination and superior supervision, road blocks can result in success stories. The joint efforts of the army, police and customs at checkpoints must be encouraged.

  1. Effective patrol/community policing

Nigerian land and sea boarders are not only large but porous. This calls for effective land and air patrol. Such effectiveness can be enhanced by “community policing”. Community policing is based on the philosophy that community intervention and support can help in crime detection, prevention and control as community members participate to identify problem of crime and disorder. Residents of villages and settlement at the boarder areas know the routes that traffickers use. They know the timings as well as those who are assisting them. Establishing a mutually beneficial tie between security agents and community members can bring innovative and proactive approach to small arms and light weapons detection. It can equally help the community to take control of itself, improve their quality of life and build the community cohesion and territoriality.

  1. Conscientization of community members

The inclusion of civil society in NATCOM has not yet yielded the desired dividends. Collaboration between civil society and the Non Government Organizations (NGOs) is expected to result in awareness creation. Such awareness based on the techniques of conscientization can stimulate a change of attitude towards illegal arms ownership. Many Nigerians who own firearms are not criminals. For them violent crime has become an indisputable fact of life and there is need to prepare to ward of criminals. We have found such preparations in tall fences around homes, security locks, burglary proofs and security gates. They keep firearms purely for self defence. In our recent study in Calabar, respondents acknowledged the proliferation of guns in the society. More than 76 per cent of them said given the correct advice, they would not own gun37. Such findings suggest that even when weapons are embedded within the society, they can be removed. What we need is awareness with a persuasive advocacy approach.

People also need to know that acquisition of guns is a serious matter that must be regulated. The criminal justice system needs to demonstrate this by prosecuting and jailing illegal gun owners as well as traffickers. A severe jail term can constitute deterrence to others.

  1. Decentralization of NATCOM

For the realization of the objective of NATCOM, there is need to decentralize its activities. Such decentralization can enhance effective country coverage and sustain its tempo. We suggest that NATCOM be structured into three, viz: “headquarters”, “state programmes” and “community partners.” While the headquarters can design programme implementation, supervision and coordination, the state officers can provide foundation for state action. The ability to provide stakeholders at this level can provide information from a variety of sources that can result in arms discovery. Community partners will not only ensure dissemination of information on the need to curb proliferation of arms at the grass root level, but can also provide feedback to the state officers and hence the headquarters. And by so doing strengthen support for NATCOM programmes.

  1. Promoting peaceful co-existence

For several years we had affirmed that “though tribes and tongues may differ, in brotherhood we stand…” (old National anthem). Such affirmation moved us to “the labour of our heroes past shall never be in vain” (new national anthem). Yet repeatedly we erred. Our multi ethnic background and several tongues associated with them have become sources of disunity that challenged the dream of our founding fathers (the Heroes past). In religion and ethnic crisis, we have found strength in arms and ammunition and have decimated our population close to what was lost during the civil war. There is need for a sincere campaign for peaceful co-existence particularly among the youth both in the urban and rural communities.

Research has shown that when youth are exposed to violence, they may become less sensitive to the pain of others; they may be more fearful of the world around them, and may more likely behave in aggressive or harmful ways toward others38. We can imagine the impact of traumatic violent events of the Jos crisis, the Niger Delta struggle, Zaki Biam, Junkun-Tiv war, and countless others on young people who were exposed to them.

While community leaders should be educated in dialogue and tolerance, the culture of peace and peaceful co-existence should be undertaken by the National Orientation Agency. We need to be reminded of the historical events that bind us together, along with the concern we have for the future. It is common knowledge that when people belong, they care, and when they care, they act, thus contributing to the well being of the society. When peace is guaranteed in our country, keeping arms and ammunition would be useless to the non-criminal minded ones.

  1. Criminalization of political violent

There is need to legislate against political violent in Nigeria. Many of our politicians believe that power flows from the barrel of guns, and not the electorates. They keep stockpile of arms and ammunition. A punitive measure which includes disqualification to stand for any elective post for culprits will discourage violent during electioneering campaigns and elections.

  1. Good governance

In this age of globalization promoted by information and communication technology (ICT), Nigerians have been exposed to the benefits of good governance and transparency in the management of public affairs elsewhere, and are demanding them at home. Good governance is a process characterized by communication and consultation, through which disputes are resolved, consensus is built and performance is reviewed on a continuous basis39. A democratic system that ensures honest government respects the economic and social rights of its citizens. It is the one that defends the people from the abuse of power by the state and non-state actors, and empowers people to assert their rights. The failure of good governance results in the Niger Delta crisis, which account for a majority of the illegal arms and ammunition that are circulating in the country today.

Conclusion

Proliferation of small arms and light weapons in Nigeria has negative consequences for socio-political and economic development in the country. The arms and ammunition are as diverse as the arms themselves. We have acknowledged the vast and the porousity of our boarder and the onerous work of NATCOM for the implementation of the ECOWAS moratorium in Nigeria. Given the extent of the constraints identified, it is necessary for the security forces to cooperate on a range of strategies including shared intelligence, coordination, communication, patrol and mounting of road blocks.

Beside conventional security measures, there is the need for advocacy aimed at conscientizing Nigerians on the adverse effect of the proliferation of small arms and light weapons in the country. Effective patrol and community policing and a deliberate effort to promote peaceful co-existence by government are also suggested. It is important to add that criminalization of violent politics, good governance and decentralization of the activities of NATCOM can help in checkmating the proliferation of arms in Nigeria as well as sustain it.

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